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This study uses trade data from Switzerland's Federal Customs Administration to 
examine the impact of COVID-19 on international goods trade between January and 
July 2020. We show that Swiss trade during that period fell by 11% compared to 
2019, and that the contraction following the “Federal Lockdown” in mid-March was 
considerably steeper than the Swiss trade collapse in the aftermath of the Lehman 
Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008. Exploiting country variation in the spread 
of COVID-19, the stringency of containment measures, and Swiss trade flows, we 
document that the pandemic adversely affected both the demand and supply side of 
foreign trade. We discuss several channels at work and show that our COVID-19 
measures are correlated with country-specific consumer and producer confidence 
series, which explain considerable heterogeneity in the observed trade dynamics.     
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1 Introduction
Cross-border trade of goods and services is one of the primary sources of economic prosperity
and of particular importance for small open economies like Switzerland. The Covid-19 pan-
demic imposes barriers to international economic exchange as potentially no other event in the
recent past.1 Early into the pandemic, Baldwin (2020) hypothesized that the Covid-19 indu-
ced decline in trade might even surpass the contraction in the aftermath of the financial crisis
in 2008, since the spread of the virus and the widely adopted countermeasures simultaneously
inflict a heavy burden on both the supply and demand side.
This paper provides an early characterization of Swiss trade during Covid-19 based on
official Swiss trade data at the product and country level. To put recent developments into
perspective, we compare exports and imports since January 2020 with trade flows during the
global recession that was ultimately triggered by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in Sep-
tember 2008. We further discuss several channels that help understand potential drivers behind
the documented patterns. In particular, we focus on Covid-19 induced demand and supply
side dynamics by exploiting cross-product and cross-trading-partner variation. We also appraise
additional factors such as international trade policy and exchange rate movements.
We show that on the outset of 2020, both the value of exported and imported goods ho-
vered around similar levels as in 2019. This dramatically changed in mid-March, when the
spread of Covid-19 accelerated and the Swiss Federal Council announced far-reaching contai-
nment measures. Until mid-year in June 2020, the accumulated value of trade fell by roughly
10% compared to 2019, and the contraction would have been considerably fiercer absent the
strong performance of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. Comparing the 2020 trade
contraction to the losses during the global financial crisis, we illustrate that the Covid-19 trig-
gered downward spiral occurred much faster and was substantially steeper. However, unlike
after the insolvency of Lehman Brothers, first signs of recovery emerged already within three
months.
1The Covid-19 pandemic is a global pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
(SARSCoV2). The outbreak was first identified in December 2019 in the Chinese city of Wuhan. The World He-
alth Organization declared the outbreak a public health emergency of international concern on 30 January 2020,
and a pandemic on 11 March. At the beginning of September 2020, more than 26 million cases of Covid-19
had been reported in more than 188 countries and territories, resulting in about 860’000 deaths.
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Examining the drivers behind Switzerland’s foreign trade collapse, we show that the export
losses coincided with a sizeable deterioration of consumer confidence. Moreover, exports during
the first two quarters of 2020 are robustly correlated with the trading partner specific Covid-19
infection rates, but almost orthogonal to the stringency of country specific containment mea-
sures. Trading partner specific Swiss import dynamics, on the other hand, are correlated with
both the stringency of governmental containment policies as well as – albeit weaker – with
Covid-19 infection rates. Overall, the data lends little support to the narrative that the costly
economic fall-out of Covid-19 should be primarily attributed to the unprecedented public
health policies; yet, we find some evidence that stringent containment measures adopted by
trading partners imposed costly barriers to the foreign producers of Swiss imports. Finally,
we document that neither protectionist trade measures nor exchange rate movements in 2020
played a major role behind the rapid decline in Swiss trade volumes.
Our work contributes to a growing economic literature that aims to shed a light on the me-
chanics and consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic.2 Previous articles on potential trade
effects of Covid-19 were either based on simulations (e.g. Maliszewska, Mattoo and Van
Der Mensbrugghe, 2020; Benz, Gonazles and Mourougane, 2020), empirical analysis of rela-
ted events such as the SARS outbreak in 2003 (Fernandes and Tang, 2020), or a combination
of descriptive historical comparisons and economic reasoning (Gruszczynski, 2020; Baldwin,
2020). Using a rich data set covering Swiss trade until July 2020, we can provide an early cha-
racterization of trade dynamics during Covid-19. Our work is also inspired by prior research
on what Baldwin (2009) called the Great Trade Collapse — the decline in international trade
following the global financial crisis that culminated in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The
sharp decline of consumer demand during and after the financial crisis, especially for durable
goods, has been pegged as main driver of the trade collapse in 2008/09 (e.g. Bems, Johnson
and Yi, 2013; Eaton et al., 2016). While our analysis can only draw on an early cutout of
2020 economic data and falls short of robustly identifying causal mechanisms, it offers several
pieces of evidence that point towards Covid-19 related ramifications on both the demand and
2Several platforms and special issues were launched to quickly disseminate scholarly work on the Covid-19
pandemic, including among others by the Centre for Economic Research (Link), the European Economic Asso-
ciation (Link) and the Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (Link).
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supply side. This simultaneity – as already argued by Baldwin (2020) – is likely a key feature
that explains the sharper contraction of exports and imports than after the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy.
2 Data on Swiss Trade and the COVID-19 Pandemic
This study builds on official trade data provided by the Swiss Federal Customs Associa-
tion (FCA). Swiss trade data is released at a high frequency, represents a significant share
of Switzerland’s economic activity, and can be disaggregated across several dimensions inclu-
ding product groups or trading partners.
We combine weekly and monthly data on trade in goods, but exclude trade in services which
is published on a quarterly basis and is generally subject to significant revisions. Weekly trade
data has the advantage that it allows to track short-term fluctuations of economic activity with
a delay of only a few days. Monthly data is published two weeks into the subsequent month,
but in return allows for cleaner year-on-year comparisons. Moreover, reporting of weekly export
data has not been standardized before February 2013, which precludes historical comparisons
with weekly data previous to that date. Unless stated otherwise, we use nominal and seasonally
unadjusted data.
Our analysis disaggregates trade data along trading partners and product groups. Our
visual analysis mostly focuses on Switzerland’s top-ten trading partners that account for 70%
of Switzerland’s foreign trade in goods. Moreover, we use the FCA’s main product classification,
which distinguishes broadly between twelve types of goods.3 Table 1 characterizes Swiss foreign
goods trade along these two dimensions.
In 2019, imports totaled 205 billion CHF while exports amounted to 242 billion CHF.4
Between 2005 and 2019, exports have risen by 54.3%, and imports by 37.6%. With regard
3For means of interpretation, we follow the classification by nature/type that is used
within the national accounts. See Appendix A.1 for an overview of all product groups and
https://www.ezv.admin.ch/ezv/en/home/topics/swiss-foreign-trade-statistics/daten/waren.html for more
detail on the different classifications.
4All trade data used in this paper exclude valuables, i.e. precious metals (mainly gold), precious stones and
gems, works of art and antiques. These goods are excluded from the analysis because they are highly volatile,
quantitatively large, and contain no business cycle relevant information.
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Table 1: Switzerland’s Main Trading Partners and Product Groups
Total Trade Exports Imports
2019 2005 2019 2005 2019 2005
Total (in bn CHF) 447.5 306.1 242.3 157.0 205.2 149.1
Total (in % of GDP) 63.9 60.1 34.6 30.9 29.3 29.3
Trading Partner (share in %)
Germany 21.9 26.2 18.2 19.9 26.2 32.8
United States 12.5 7.6 17.3 10.4 6.7 4.7
Italy 7.3 10.1 5.8 9.2 9.1 11.0
France 6.6 9.3 5.9 8.6 7.4 10.0
China 6.3 2.2 5.5 2.1 7.3 2.3
United Kingdom 4.2 4.7 3.8 5.1 4.6 4.3
Austria 3.2 4.0 2.4 3.3 4.0 4.8
Spain 3.1 3.4 3.2 4.2 3.0 2.7
Japan 2.6 2.8 3.3 3.6 1.6 1.9
Netherlands 2.5 4.3 2.4 3.5 2.7 5.0
Other countries 29.9 25.5 32.1 30.1 27.4 20.7
Product Group (share in %)
06 - Pharmaceuticals 37.4 28.6 47.3 34.9 25.7 22.0
11 - Prec., Watches, Jewellery 18.1 12.6 20.8 17.6 14.8 7.2
09 - Machines 14.3 21.3 13.2 22.4 15.6 20.1
08 - Metals 6.4 7.9 5.6 7.4 7.3 8.3
10 - Vehicles 5.6 6.1 2.3 2.8 9.5 9.6
01 - Agriculture 5.5 5.3 4.2 3.3 7.1 7.4
03 - Textiles 3.8 4.3 2.1 2.7 5.8 5.9
02 - Energy 2.6 4.8 1.0 2.2 4.5 7.5
05 - Leather 2.6 3.1 1.9 2.7 3.4 3.5
12 - Various 1.6 2.2 0.5 1.2 2.8 3.3
04 - Paper 1.3 2.8 0.8 2.2 1.9 3.4
07 - Stones & Earth 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.8
Note: All numbers refer to trade in goods excluding precious metals (mainly gold), gems and other
valuables. See Table A.1 in the Appendix for the full definition of the product groups. Source: FCA.
to the main trading partners, Switzerland is traditionally oriented towards the neighboring
European Union. In the past 15 years, Swiss trade with the United States and China has
grown overproportionally, especially on the export side. In 2019, most trade occurred with
Germany (97.9 bn CHF, 21.9%), followed by the United States (12.4%), Italy (7.3%), France
(6.6%), China (6.3%), and the United Kingdom (4.2%).
Concerning trade by product groups, we observe an increasing trade share of chemical and
pharmaceutical exports: In 2005, chemical and pharmaceutical exports amounted to 54.8 billion
CHF (34.9%), while they reached 114.6 billion CHF (47.3%) in 2019. Similarly, yet to a lesser
extent, the trade share of precision instruments, watches and jewelry also increased over the
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Figure 1: Total of COVID-19 Cases and Stringency of Countermeasures
Note: Panel (a) plots the total number of Covid-19 cases per 1000 people for Switzerland and its ten main trading partners.
Panel (b) plots the stringency of Covid-19 countermeasures by Switzerland and its ten main trading partners; higher values indicate
more stringent measures. Sources: Johns Hopkins University’s Coronavirus Resource Center, Oxford University Coronavirus
Government Response Tracker.
imports are largely dominated by jewelry. On the losing side, we find the products of the
machinery and metal industry, a sector of the economy that was hit hard in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis 2008 and has not yet fully recovered.
We complement the trade data with information on the spread of Covid-19 across countries
and its accompanying containment measures by governments. We draw data on the total num-
ber of cases per thousand inhabitants from Johns Hopkins University’s Coronavirus Resource
Center . Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows substantial differences in when and how the first wave
of Covid-19 infections took place. One explanation for the cross-country heterogeneity in the
shape of the first wave of infections is the variation in both the measures that governments
implemented and when they set them in place. Oxford University’s Coronavirus Government
Response Tracker provides a country-specific measure ranging from 0 to 100 on how strongly
governments intervened to contain the spread of the pandemic. Such measures include the
shutdown of businesses, the closure of schools, as well as severe travel restrictions.
3 Swiss Foreign Trade during the COVID-19 Crisis
We now present the development of Swiss foreign trade during the Covid-19 crisis until summer
2020. First, we discuss weekly dynamics from an aggregate perspective in Section 3.1, and then
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turn to differences across trading partners and product groups in Section 3.2.
3.1 Weekly Trade Dynamics
Figure 2 plots the nominal value in billion CHF of goods exported (Panel a) or imported (Pa-
nel b) by Switzerland during the first 30 calendar weeks of 2020. As a benchmark, we also
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Figure 2: Weekly Exports and Imports During the COVID-19 Crisis Compared to
Previous Years
Note: Nominal and non seasonally adjusted weekly data for Switzerland. Relaxation 1: reopening of personal care, gardening
center; Relaxation 2: reopening of compulsory school, public transport, retail trade, restaurant (partially); Relaxation 3: most
remaining restrictions are lifted. Source: FCA.
On March 16, that is in calendar week 12, the Swiss Federal Council declared an Extraordi-
nary Situation for Switzerland invoking the Federal Epidemics Act. All shops, restaurants, bars
and leisure facilities had to remain closed until the gradual relaxation of mitigation measures
in May and June. This event is labelled as “Swiss Lockdown” in Figure 2. Prior to that date,
exports and imports reached levels similar to those of 2019 but clearly exceeded trade levels in
2018 and 2017. The positive trade dynamics in January and February are consistent with the
economic recovery at the international level which took place after the economic slowdown in
the second half of 2019.
5The low values in week 1 are due to the fact that the first week of the year generally has less business days
than other weeks of the year. Further, the trough in weeks 15 and 16 of 2020 should be taken with care, as
both weeks have one business day less due to the Easter weekend. Similarly, some of the fluctuations in 2020
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(b) Cumulative Imports
Figure 3: Cumulative Exports and Imports During the COVID-19 Crisis Compared
to Previous Years
Note: Nominal and non seasonally adjusted weekly data for Switzerland. Relaxation 1: reopening of personal care, gardening
center; Relaxation 2: reopening of compulsory school, public transport, retail trade, restaurant (partially); Relaxation 3: most
remaining restrictions are lifted. Source: FCA.
Following the introduction of the Covid-19 containment measures (which largely coincided
with the global spread of the virus), Switzerland’s foreign trade in goods fell sharply: while
weekly exports hovered around 5 billion CHF at the beginning of the year, they dropped by
almost 25% to an average of 3.8 billion CHF during the most stringent phase of the lockdown.
The shock had a similar impact on imports, which fell by about 30% compared to the pre-crisis
level. Although a mild recovery of trade can be observed at the end of April, weekly trade
volumes have remained at or even below trade volumes in 2017.
As the data plotted in Figure 2 display substantial fluctuations, it is instructive to inspect
data on cumulative imports and exports. Figure 3 illustrates that the period shortly after the
lockdown in March marks an inflection point: both exports, shown in Panel (a), and imports,
shown in Panel (b) begin to bend downwards around week 15.
Between the start of the lockdown in week 12 and the third relaxation phase beginning in
week 23, the trade collapse accumulated to 8.1 billion CHF in exports and 10.0 billion CHF
in imports compared to 2019. At the end of the covered time period in week 30 (end of
July), the accumulated loss since week 12 even amounted to 14.1 billion CHF in exports and
14.7 billion CHF in imports. While the gap in weekly trade levels has substantially narrowed
a full recovery of the cumulative trade volume to 2019-levels appears very unlikely.
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3.2 Heterogeneity Across Trading Partners and Product Groups
The previous section documents that both aggregate exports and imports suffered substantial
losses following the onset of the Covid-19 crisis. We now look at how the drop in Swiss foreign
trade is distributed across different trading partners and product groups. Figure 4 summarizes
the main findings by showing the cumulative change in exports (vertical axis) and imports (ho-
rizontal axis) during the first half-year of 2020 compared to the same period of 2019. Panel (a)
displays changes in trade by trading partners, while Panel (b) plots changes across product
groups. Marker sizes in both graphs indicate relative trade volumes (exports+imports) bet-
ween January and June of 2020. A subplot specific marker size corresponding to 25 billion CHF
is shown in the lower right corner of each figure.6
Starting in the upper right quadrant of Panel (a), we observe that trade with only one
country, namely China, increased in 2020 compared to 2019. The other main trading partner
experiencing an increase in exports (but contraction in imports) is Austria. The rise in Japanese
and Spanish imports came along with a fairly sharp decrease in their exports. The majority
of countries are located in the left bottom quadrant, implying that both imports and exports
decreased. In the case of the United Kingdom, exports declined by more than 25%, while
imports fell by 40%. The neighboring countries Italy, Germany and France show substantial
losses in exports and imports ranging between 10% and 20%. Concerning the United States,
exports only dropped marginally, while imports fell substantially.
When we disaggregate the change in trade flows by product group in Panel (b), the per-
formance of chemical and pharmaceutical products stands out. As discussed in Section 2, the
share of this product group has risen significantly in recent years and reached 37.4% of total
trade in 2019. It is the only product group for which exports have risen in the first half of 2020
compared to 2019. In recent years, exports of this product group have grown by an average
of 1% per month. Several factors explain the continued expansion of pharmaceuticals exports
in 2020: First, foreign demand for Swiss pharmaceutical products is particularly inelastic with
6We decided to cover the January to June (instead of July) window for two reasons: First, the period between
January and June marks the first half year 2020. Second, we use both quarterly data and monthly data in the
regression analysis presented in Section 5, which therefore has to rely on the January to June window. In any
case, adding trade data from July would not change the qualitative insights from Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Exports and Imports During the COVID-19 Crisis by Tra-
ding Partners and Product Groups, First Half of 2020.
Note: Nominal and non seasonally adjusted monthly data for Switzerland. The figures show the percentage change in cumulative
exports (y-axis) and imports (x-axis) from January to June 2020 (i.e. calendar week 1 to 26) compared to the same period in
2019. Marker sizes indicate the relative trade volumes (exports + imports) in 2020. See Table 1 for details on the different trading
partners and product groups. Source: FCA.
respect to economic and exchange rate shocks. These highly specialized products are typically
protected by patents, which results in a lack of substitutes. Second, in times of crisis, people
are more likely to reduce their consumption of durable goods (cars, appliances, etc.) than their
health care spending. This is probably even more the case in times of a pandemic. On the
import side, the only product group having increased during the Covid-19 crisis is textiles,
clothing and shoes. This can mainly be attributed to the sharp increase in demand for masks
and protective clothing. The remaining product groups registered moderate to significant de-
clines in both exports and imports. For instance, export-oriented manufacturing industries
like machinery, electronic devices and industrial metals registered substantial declines of more
than 10% in cumulative exports. Symptomatically, trade in business cycle sensitive goods like
precision instruments, jewelry or vehicles dropped steepest between January and June 2020.
Overall, exports fell by 8.4% and imports dropped by 13.3% in the first half year of 2020
compared to 2019. If we consider exports and imports without chemical and pharmaceutical
products, which proved much more resilient than other products during the first phase of the
Covid-19 crisis, the trade plunge even amounted to 17.1% for exports and 21.4% for imports.
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4 Comparison with the Global Financial Crisis
In order to put the trade collapse during the Covid-19 crisis into perspective, we compare
the 2020 development to the drop in trade which occurred after the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 and the subsequent recession.
Since World War II, global trade as a share of world GDP increased steadily. A heightened
world trading potential, reductions in trade barriers, and greater vertical supply integration
(among other factors) boosted the trade-to-GDP ratio from around 25% in 1960 to 60% in
2008.7 Then, however, the financial crisis and its consequences led to a decline in world trade
of more than ten percent and global trade as a share of GDP fell to 52.3% in 2009 – the largest
decline of global trade in decades (Baldwin, 2009; Baldwin and di Mauro, 2020). Moreover, the
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Figure 5: Monthly Swiss Exports and Imports since 2005
Note: Nominal and seasonally adjusted monthly data for Switzerland. Source: FCA.
Figure 5 illustrates monthly, nominal and seasonally adjusted Swiss exports and imports
since 2005. We observe a steep decline in both exports and imports after the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, growth of Swiss
7See for instance Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), Clemens and Williamson (2004), Freund (2009), Irwin
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Figure 6: Financial Crisis vs. COVID-19 Pandemic: Year-on-Year Trade Changes
Note: Nominal and non seasonally adjusted monthly data for Switzerland. The figures illustrate Switzerland’s changes in trade
volumes following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the Covid-19 Lockdown in March 2020. Panel (a)
shows cumulative year-on-year absolute differences (beginning 3 months prior to the event), while Panel (b) plots the year-on-year
monthly growth rate in percent. Source: FCA.
foreign trade remained curbed for several years. A range of factors such as the appreciation
of the Swiss Franc or the European sovereign debt crisis impeded a full recovery. Driven by
dynamic foreign and domestic demand, exports and imports experienced another episode of
high growth between 2016 and 2019. In the context of rising protectionism as well as slowing
domestic demand, both global and Swiss trade reached a plateau in the second half of 2019.
Figure 5 allows to get a first impression of the trade collapse in 2020 caused by Covid-19
compared to its decline during the financial crisis 2008/2009. In April 2020, Swiss exports
fell to a level last reached in January 2016, and for imports the downturn was even more
pronounced. How does the recent decline in trade compare to the collapse during the financial
crisis 2008/2009? To answer this question, we provide two plots in Figure 6. For both time
windows, we first define a specific event that triggered the deterioration of foreign goods trade:
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the Swiss lockdown in mid-March
2020. Then, we calculate the cumulative trade volumes in Panel (a) as well as the monthly
percentage changes in Panel (b). As a reference period, we use the corresponding month of the
previous year.
Panel (a) of Figure 6 indicates that the 2020 trade collapse evolved much faster than in the
aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Within four months, both exports and imports
fell by a cumulative sum of about 14 billion CHF. By contrast, it took about nine months after
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the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008 until the cumulative loss in exports and imports
reached such levels. The data not only suggests, however, that the Covid-19 induced collapse
was more rapid, but that the recovery could be faster, too. As Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows,
exports exhibited a negative growth trend for 9 months and imports started to recover within
7 months after the 2008 event. During the Covid-19 crisis, the recovery and stabilization of
imports and exports already commenced in the third month after the lockdown in mid-March.
We can dive further into the details by again looking at differences across trading partners
and product groups. For the majority of Switzerland’s main trading partners, the decline in
cumulative exports and imports during the current crisis was greater than during the global
financial crisis (data not shown). Extreme cases are Japan and the United Kingdom: While
Swiss imports from Japan evolved similarly in 2020 and 2008/2009, the drop in exports between
March and July 2020 exceeded the contraction between September 2008 and January 2009 by
40 percentage points. Concerning Great Britain, the dip in Swiss exports and imports during
Covid-19 was more than 20 percentage points deeper compared to the first months of the
financial crisis. The magnitudes are smaller for France, Italy, Germany, and the United States,
but losses are still considerably larger in 2020 than during the global financial crisis 2008/2009.
On the other end of the ranking we find China, where both exports (+7 percentage points)
and imports (+18 percentage points) performed much better during the 2020 crisis than in
2008/2009. China’s relative trade statistics are trailed by those for Spain and Austria, the only
other major trading partners of Switzerland performing better during the Covid-19 crisis than
in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
When we compare the trade statistics between the two trade collapses disaggregated by
product groups, we observe the greatest gap in the groups “precision instruments, watches and
jewelry” as well as “vehicles”. Considering that the former group accounts for about 18% in
Swiss trade, additional losses in this category (about a 40 percentage points stronger drop in
2020 than 2008) weigh heavily on aggregate dynamics of exports and imports. On the upside,
trade volumes in the largest product group, namely “chemicals and pharmaceuticals”, have
been equivalently resilient to negative shocks during both crises.
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5 What Explains the Swiss Trade Collapse in 2020?
Even when compared with other major events such as the financial crisis of 2008, the contraction
witnessed in spring 2020 is unprecedented. We now discuss potential drivers for this rapid
decline. In particular, we examine and discuss the following channels: (i) Covid-19 induced
demand shocks, (ii) Covid-19 induced supply shocks, (iii) protective trade measures due to
Covid-19, and (iv) exchange rate movements due to major shifts in currency demand.
5.1 COVID-19 Induced Demand Shocks
We begin the discussion with another appraisal of the product-specific change in trade volumes
plotted in Panel (b) of Figure 4. The two product groups that suffered the largest losses in
the first two quarters of 2020 are “precision instruments, watches and jewelry” and “vehicles”.
Both groups primarily comprise durable consumption goods, such as watches and passenger
cars. This suggests that a contraction in Swiss and foreign demand is likely a major driver
behind the trade collapse.
The Swiss watch industry suffered particularly in the context of the current crisis: the
sudden stop in international tourism activities, combined with the temporary closures of retail
stores, brought domestic and foreign sales to a near standstill. Concerning the fall in the trade
of vehicles, it is essentially attributable to the fall in domestic demand for passenger cars,
causing imports of vehicles to collapse both in Switzerland and abroad.
Similar, albeit less pronounced patterns were documented for trade in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis: According to Eaton et al. (2016), plunging demand was the driving
force behind the considerable trade contraction during and after the financial crisis of 2008. In
general, this explanation fits well with the idea that economic uncertainty causes consumers to
defer spending, especially on non-essential and expensive products.8
To further assess the link between contraction of demand and declining trade flows, we
plot standardized consumer confidence indices for Switzerland and its main trading partners
in Panel (a) of Figure 7. While consumers in most countries were relatively optimistic at





































































Figure 7: Standardized Consumer and Producer Confidence in 2020
Note: Panel (a) plots the consumer confidence index for Switzerland and its ten main trading partners. Panel (b) shows the
Manufacturing Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) for the same sample. All series are standardized by deducting the long-run
average and dividing the demeaned series with the long-run standard deviation. Sources: IHS Markit, Macrobond.
the outset of 2020, the spread of Covid-19 led to a substantial drop in consumer confidence
of about 2 standard deviations (SD) around March. All countries plotted in Panel (a) of
Figure 7 experienced a drop in consumer confidence, but the slump is most pronounced in
Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.9 This pattern also fits with the trade dynamics
discussed in Sections 3 and 4: The plunge in Swiss exports to the United Kingdom and Japan in
the first half of 2020 was disproportionately deep, and foreign exports to Switzerland – which
are decisively driven by Swiss demand – fell even more sharply than Swiss exports to other
countries.
We further assess the link between consumer confidence and Swiss exports in columns (5)
and (9) of Table 2. While the relatively small sample size (40 trading partners) and country
differences in the periodicity of consumer confidence data only allow for a coarse analysis, the
regression estimates based on monthly frequency (in column 5) and quarterly frequency (in
column 9) confirm that consumer confidence in the importing countries explains considerable
heterogeneity in country-specific growth rates of Swiss exports in 2020.
9While consumer confidence measures based on surveys are available for a broad set of countries, one caveat
concerns unequal periodicity of the available series. In most countries, for instance in the US, Germany, China,
or UK, consumer confidence data is available on a monthly basis, while for other countries, such as Switzerland
and Japan, it is available on a quarterly basis. The lower frequency of the Swiss consumer confidence data
hampers its comparability, yet higher frequency measures of consumer sentiment based on Google searches also
confirm that Swiss consumer confidence took a deep dive in Spring 2020 and has not fully recovered in August
(see Eichenauer et al., 2020).
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Table 2: Correlates of Swiss Exports between January and June 2020
%-Change in Exports Monthly Data Quarterly Data
Compared to 2019 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Covid-19 Cases =2.21∗∗ =2.23∗∗ =1.41+ =0.89∗∗ =0.86∗∗
per 1000 People (0.74) (0.83) (0.72) (0.28) (0.30)
Stringency Index =0.02 0.02 0.03 =0.10 =0.08
Countermeasures (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16)
Consumer 4.57∗ 5.31∗
Confidence (in SD) (2.15) (2.51)
R2 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.24
Time Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading partner FE No No No Yes No No No No No
Trading Partners 55 55 55 55 40 55 55 55 40
Observations 300 300 300 300 215 110 110 110 79
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage change in monthly (col. 1–5) or quarterly (col. 6–9) exports
compared to 2019. Covid-19 Cases per 1000 People denotes the increase in a country’s confirmed Covid-19 ca-
ses per 1000 inhabitants during that month/quarter. Stringency Index Countermeasures represents the average
stringency score of a country during that month/quarter taking values between 0 (no measures) and 100 (max-
imum stringency). Consumer Confidence represents the standardized monthly/quarterly deviation from the
long-term mean in a country’s consumer confidence. We restrict the sample to countries with a minimum an-
nual trade value of 500 million CHF and monthly trade values of at least 25 million CHF in 2019. Descriptive
statistics are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by trading partners.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
A central question is whether differences in Covid-19 infections and/or containment mea-
sures across trading partners (see Figure 1) explain heterogeneity in Swiss export dynamics. If
one or both of these two Covid-19 induced shocks to foreign demand play a key role in the
trade collapse of 2020, we should see that exports declined more strongly when being shipped
to trading partners particularly affected by Covid-19. To test this hypothesis, Table 2 pre-
sents the estimates for seven regression models that provide correlations between our two main
Covid-19 measures presented in Figure 1 with year-on-year changes in Swiss exports between
January and June 2020.
Columns (1) to (4) use monthly data, while columns (6) to (8) re-estimate a subset of
models based on quarterly data. The sample includes all Swiss trading partners that exceed
a minimum trade level and where data on the selected explanatory variables is available. We
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restrict the estimation sample to those countries with a minimum annual total trade value of
500 million CHF and a monthly trade value of at least 25 million CHF in 2019, and apply
this threshold to all estimations in Table 2. The aim of this procedure is to eliminate extreme
outliers that can be traced back to periodically tiny trade volumes of small trading partners in
the base year 2019. Since such potentially tiny numbers enter the denominator, even a small
absolute increase in trade flows can lead to a relative increase of several thousand percentage
points.10
Results in columns (1) to (4) and (6) to (8) of Table 2 unambiguously suggest that differen-
ces in Covid-19 infection rates help explain changes in country-specific exports. Specifically,
the larger the number of Covid-19 cases (per 1000 people) in a partner country, the larger
the decline in Swiss exports to this country. At the same time, we find virtually zero corre-
lation between Covid-19 containment measures (i.e. stringency index) and export changes.
Apparently, demand for Swiss exports was primarily driven by the spread of Covid-19 in the
trading partners, but not by the stringency of their countermeasures. This finding is robust to
the use of different data frequencies (monthly vs. quarterly) and also to the inclusion of trading
partner fixed effects (see column 4) that account for time-constant country characteristics that
may lead to spurious correlations.11
It is noteworthy that the consumer confidence estimates reported in columns (5) and (9)
remain robust, even when we include Covid-19 cases per thousand inhabitants, while the
estimate for the latter becomes insignificant (results not shown). This is consistent with the
notion that the impact of Covid-19 runs mainly via consumer confidence.12 In summary, the
10Overall, the main patterns reported in Table 2 are reasonably robust to changes in this threshold. We
will also apply the same threshold to analyse imports in Section 5.2, Table 3; since Table 3 features PMI data
as explanatory variable, where less than 30 countries are available, the according estimates become somewhat
sensitive to overly conservative restrictions, as the available samples get critically small.
11For instance, the quality of public health policies (such as testing regimes) likely differ across countries, and
these differences may be correlated with the long-term trade composition. We also re-estimated columns (1),
(2), and (5) including trading partner fixed effects: While the results for models (1) and (2) remain qualitatively
unaffected, the point estimate for consumer confidence in column (5) drops to 3.8 and becomes insignificant
(t-value=1.4); note, however, that including trading partner fixed effects makes estimations vulnerable to in-
accuracies in the timing, since the fixed effects model identifies the estimates based on within-group variation
only. This may be an issue regarding consumer confidence data, which is only available at quarterly (not
monthly) periodicity for several countries.
12We also regressed consumer confidence on confirmed Covid-19 cases per 1000 people, and find a negative
albeit insignificant relationship (t-value=1.4).
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available evidence strongly suggests that a demand side contraction driven by the global spread
of Covid-19 was a major ingredient leading to the unprecedented trade collapse in the first half
of 2020. We next discuss to what extent supply side dynamics explain the observed patterns.
5.2 COVID-19 Induced Supply Shocks
Another likely channel are contractions on the supply side, as containment measures imposed
by governments complicated business operations, or because employees missed work (Koren and
Pető, 2020). Although the drop in intermediate and capital goods was not as pronounced as for
consumer durable goods, Panel (b) of Figure 4 shows that products of the groups “Machines,
appliances, electronics” and “Metals” were traded considerably less in 2020 than in 2019.
Capacity utilization in the Swiss mechanical and electrical engineering industries fell far
below its long term average and companies complained about high obstacles in production due
to the Covid-19 restrictions. To examine the link between business restrictions and Swiss
foreign trade in 2020, we plot standardized manufacturing Purchasing Manager Indices (PMI)
for Switzerland and its main trading partners in Panel (b) of Figure 7. These series capture
the managers’ sentiments about the general business environment, and hence partially measure
whether producers face (cost-driving) obstacles in their daily operations.
While producer sentiment in early 2020 was slightly below the long-run average, the spread
of Covid-19 led to a very pronounced drop of about three standard deviations around March.
China, where the virus occurred first, run about one month ahead of the other countries and
recovered quickly. The United Kingdom suffered from the deepest plunge in producer senti-
ment, while Switzerland and Japan — quite in contrast to the consumer confidence series —
experienced fairly contained fluctuations in their PMIs. It is also noteworthy that producer
confidence, despite the deeper drop, recovered more quickly than consumer sentiment. This
pattern also fits with the trade dynamics discussed in Sections 3 and 4: The plunge in Swiss
exports to the United Kingdom and Japan in the first half of 2020 was disproportionately deep,
and foreign exports to Switzerland — which are decisively driven by Swiss demand — fell even
more sharply than Swiss exports to other countries.
Total Swiss imports in the first half of 2020 fell by 13.3% compared with 2019. However,
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Table 3: Correlates of Swiss Import Flows between January and June 2020
%-Change in imports Monthly Data Quarterly Data
compared to 2019 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Covid-19 Cases =2.08 =1.55 =1.38 =1.08+ =0.84
per 1000 People (1.38) (1.40) (1.51) (0.62) (0.60)
Stringency Index =0.33∗ =0.30∗ =0.15 =0.49∗ =0.45∗
Countermeasures (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.20) (0.19)
Purchasing Manager 4.61+ 6.93
Index (in SD) (2.65) (4.60)
R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.11
Time Period FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trading Partners FE No No No Yes No No No No No
Trading Partners 55 55 55 55 28 55 55 55 28
Observations 300 300 300 300 164 110 110 110 56
Notes: The dependent variable is the percentage change in monthly (col. 1–5) or quarterly (col. 6–9) imports
compared to 2019. Covid-19 Cases per 1000 People denotes the increase in a countries confirmed Covid-19 ca-
ses per 1000 inhabitants during that month/quarter. Stringency Index Countermeasures represents the average
stringency score of a country during that month/quarter taking values between 0 (no measures) and 100 (max-
imum stringency). The Purchasing Manager Index represents the monthly/quarterly standardized deviation
from the long-term mean in managers’ confidence. We restrict the sample to countries with a minimum annual
trade value of 500 million CHF and a monthly trade value of at least 25 million CHF in 2019. Descriptive
statistics are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by trading partners.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.
imports of intermediate products decreased by 16.9%. Intermediate goods account for a large
and growing share of international trade due to global value chains. Switzerland as a high-wage
country relies heavily on such intermediate goods from abroad. They account for more than
one-fifth of all imports.
If the Covid-19 induced shock to foreign production plays a key role in the trade collapse
of 2020, we should see that imports declined more strongly when coming from trading partners
particularly affected by the pandemic. To test this hypothesis, we replicate Table 2 and regress
the percent change in Swiss imports (in the first half of 2020 compared to 2019) on three
explanatory variables: the number of Covid-19 cases, the stringency index, and the PMI.
The estimation results suggest that – in contrast to the results on exports – variation in
the stringency of government-imposed containment measures are more consistently correlated
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with year-on-year changes in Swiss imports. Both monthly and quarterly data suggest that
stricter government restrictions in foreign countries were associated with sharper declines in
Swiss imports from those countries. As for exports, the number of confirmed Covid-19 cases
is also negatively correlated with import growth; while the point estimates remain similar in
magnitude, they are less precisely estimated with imports so that four out of five coefficients
are statistically insignificant.
Again, there is some evidence supporting the narrative that an important channel of the
Covid-19 impact runs via the confidence of economic actors: Swiss imports from countries
with low PMI scores dropped particularly strongly, as columns (5) and (9) show (t-values: 1.5–
1.7). The point estimates of both Covid-19 measures drop by around 60% once we include
the PMI in the models of columns (1) to (3), while the PMI’s point estimate remains almost
unaffected but gets somewhat less precise (results not reported). Regressing the monthly PMI
on the government stringency index further confirms that the government measures dragged
down producer sentiments (t-value:-4.9, results not reported).
In summary, this analysis confirms the hypothesis that the spread of Covid-19 negatively
impacted international trade by affecting both the demand and the supply side. While data
suggest that foreign demand for Swiss goods was almost exclusively driven by confirmed Co-
vid-19 cases, the foreign supply of goods is more strongly correlated with the stringency of
government measures. If assessed jointly (results not shown), namely by modelling the value of
total trade instead of imports in columns (3) and (4), the negative correlation with confirmed
Covid-19 cases (t-value without FE: -2.6, t-value with FE: -3.1) clearly dominates the correla-
tion with public health measures (t-value without FE: -1.3, t-value with FE: -0.8). Overall, the
data lends little support to the narrative that the costly economic fall-out of Covid-19 should
be primarily attributed to the unprecedented public health policies; yet, we find some evidence
that stringent containment measures adopted by trading partners imposed costly barriers to
the foreign producers of Swiss imports.
In the following, we assess two additional channels, which might help to explain the con-
traction of Swiss trade in 2020: Protective trade policies and exchange rate shifts.
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5.3 Protectionism
Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, countries around the world erected new barriers for travel
and trade in an effort to contain the virus. Concerning goods trade, some countries also imposed
protective restrictions on exports of highly essential products, such as pharmaceuticals and
food. A systematic look at global trade measures, however, makes protective trade policies
a very unlikely driver behind the documented trade collapse. Neither Switzerland nor its
main trading partners erected an unusually high number of protective trade barriers. The
trend between January and July points rather to the contrary, as Global Trade Alert data (see
Evenett and Fritz, 2020) plotted in Panel (a) of Figure 8 documents: the number of protective
trade measures relative to the number of liberalizing policies was much higher in 2018 and 2019
than in 2020. In the first half of 2020, 156 new harmful trade restrictions by trading partners
vis--vis Switzerland exceeded 121 liberalizing policies by a total of 35. This is substantially less
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Figure 8: Global Trade Interventions and Swiss Franc against Major Currencies.
Note: Panel (a) illustrates global trade interventions for 2018, 2019, and 2020; a positive value indicates that the number of newly
imposed liberalizing interventions exceeded the number of newly imposed harmful interventions, while a negative value implies that
trade policy became more protectionist. Panel (b) plots the CHF/JPY, CHF/EUR, CHF/USD and CHF/GBP exchange rates
normalized to 100 on the first trading day in 2020, i.e. 3.1.2020; a rise in the index value from 100 to 105 indicates a 5 percent
appreciation of the Swiss Franc. Sources: Global Trade Alert https://www.globaltradealert.org/, Swiss National Bank.
5.4 Exchange Rate Movements
The Swiss franc is well known to serve as a safe haven currency during times of global economic
uncertainty (e.g. Jaeggi, Schlegel and Zanetti, 2019). We therefore briefly address, whether
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Covid-19 related uncertainty led to major inflows of capital therewith appreciating the Swiss
franc and putting pressure on the export oriented industry; this was the case during the Eu-
ropean debt crisis, culminating in the announcement of a minimum exchange rate floor by the
Swiss National Bank in September 2011. We abstain from analyzing actual capital flows (which
might have been neutralized by the Swiss National Bank), but simply discuss fluctuations in
four major exchange rates during the period January to July 2020.
For three out of four major exchange rates plotted in Panel (b) of Figure 8 (namely,
CHF/USD, CHF/EURO, CHF/JPY), we observe no noteworthy fluctuations in 2020. These
three exchange rates consistently fluctuated within an narrow index-band spanning 95 to 105,
so that they can be safely ruled out as driving factors behind the documented trade collapse
starting in mid-March.13 The one exception is the Swiss franc to British pound exchange rate
that appreciated by 15% in early March. While this – together with Britain’s withdrawal from
the EU on 31 January 2020 – might have significantly contributed to the substantial shifts
observed in Swiss-British trade, the overall exchange rate fluctuations were certainly too small
to explain a relevant share of Switzerland’s unprecedented trade contraction in spring 2020.
6 Conclusion
The Swiss economy is deeply integrated in global value chains. Due to its detailed trade data
that is published at a high frequency, Switzerland serves us as valuable case study for an early
appraisal of trade dynamics during the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. Using weekly and monthly
trade data, we document how fast, to what extent, and along which dimensions the Swiss trade
collapse evolved between January and July 2020.
Between the lockdown in mid-March and the end of July, the Swiss economy experienced
trade losses of 14 billion CHF in exports and 15 billion CHF in imports compared to 2019.
Product diversity potentially helped to prevent even greater losses: goods from the chemical
and pharmaceutical industry were notably resilient, while all other sectors experienced dramatic
13The fairly mild fluctuations could at least partially be the result of interventions by the Swiss National
Bank, as their foreign currency investments increased from 794 to 863 billion CHF during the discussed time
period.
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declines in both imports and exports.
Our analysis of country-specific trade data suggests that the Covid-19 related losses can be
attributed to both the spread of the pandemic as well as the contingency measures implemented
by governments across the globe. The contraction in Swiss exports is consistently correlated
with the number of confirmed Covid-19 cases in importing countries, while Swiss imports are
more strongly correlated with the stringency of government measures in the exporting economy.
The strong correlation of both Swiss export and import flows with country-specific measures
of the Covid-19 burden support the hypothesis that the unprecedented trade collapse can be
traced back to pandemic induced disruptions on both the demand and supply side. At the
same time, our results also highlight that one should be cautious with outrightly blaming or
fully absolving health policy measures from inducing substantial economic costs.
22
References
Anderson, James, and Eric Van Wincoop. 2004. “Trade Costs.” Journal of Economic Literature,
42(3): 691–751.
Baldwin, Richard. 2009. The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences, and Prospects. Centre for Eco-
nomic Policy Research (CEPR).
Baldwin, Richard. 2020. “The Greater Trade Collapse of 2020: Learnings from the 2008-09 Great Trade
Collapse.” Published Online as VoxEU.org Column.
Baldwin, Richard, and Beatrice Weder di Mauro. 2020. Economics in the Time of COVID-19. Centre
for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).
Bems, Rudolfs, Robert Johnson, and Kei-Mu Yi. 2013. “The Great Trade Collapse.” Annual Review of
Economics, 5(1): 375–400.
Benz, Sebastian, Frederic Gonazles, and Annabelle Mourougane. 2020. “The Impact of COVID-
19 International Travel Restrictions on Services-Trade Costs: Some Illustrative Scenarios.” CEPR Covid
Econonomics, Vetted and Real Time Papers, 45: 65–77.
Brown, Martin, Matthias Fengler, Rafael Lalive, Robert Rohrkemper, and Thomas Spycher.
2020. “Spreading Out: COVID-19 and the Changing Geography of Consumption.” Published Online as LSE
Business Review Column.
Clemens, Michael, and Jeffrey Williamson. 2004. “Why Did the Tariff–Growth Correlation Change after
1950?” Journal of Economic Growth, 9(1): 5–46.
Eaton, Jonathan, Samuel Kortum, Brent Neiman, and John Romalis. 2016. “Trade and the Global
Recession.” American Economic Review, 106(11): 3401–38.
Eichenauer, Vera, Ronald Indergand, Isabel Martinez, and Christoph Sax. 2020. “Constructing Daily
Economic Sentiment Indices Based on Google Trends.” KOF Working Papers, 484.
Evenett, Simon, and Johannes Fritz. 2020. “The Global Trade Alert database handbook.” Published Online
as Manuscript, Version 14 July 2020.
Fernandes, Ana, and Heiwai Tang. 2020. “How Did the 2003 SARS Epidemic Shape Chinese Trade?”
CEPR Covid Econonomics, Vetted and Real Time Papers, 22: 154–176.
Freund, Caroline. 2009. “The Trade Response To Global Downturns: Historical Evidence.” World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper Nr. 5015.
Gruszczynski, Lukasz. 2020. “The COVID-19 Pandemic and International Trade: Temporary Turbulence or
Paradigm Shift?” European Journal of Risk Regulation, 11(2): 337–342.
Irwin, Douglas. 2002. “Long-Run Trends in World Trade and Income.” World Trade Review, 1(1): 89–100.
23
Jacks, David, and Krishna Pendakur. 2010. “Global Trade and the Maritime Transport Revolution.” The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4): 745–755.
Jaeggi, Adrian, Martin Schlegel, and Attilio Zanetti. 2019. “Macroeconomic Surprises, Market Envi-
ronment, and Safe-Haven Currencies.” Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, 155(1): 1–21.
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A Appendix
Table A.1: Product Classifications in the Swiss Dataset
01 Forestry and agricultural products, fisheries
01.1 Food, beverages and tobacco
01.2 Feeding stuffs for animals
01.3 Live animals
01.4 Horticultural products
01.5 Forestry products (not firewood)
01.6 Products for commercial/industrial processing such as oils, fats, plants and vegetable parts, etc.
02 Energy source
02.1 Solid combustibles
02.2 Petroleum and distillates
02.3 Gas
02.4 Electrical energy
03 Textiles, clothing, shoes
03.1 Textiles
03.2 Articles of apparel and clothing
03.3 Shoes, parts and accessories
04 Paper, articles of paper and and products of the printing industry
04.1 Basic materials for paper production, cellulose (fibre) and paper and carton waste
04.2 Paper and carton in rolls, strips or sheets
04.3 Goods from paper or carton
04.4 Products of the printing industry




06 Products of the chemical and pharmaceutical industry
06.1 Chemical raw materials, basic materials and unformed plastics
06.2 Chemical end products, vitamins, diagnostic products, including active substances
07 Stones and earth
07.1 Mineral raw materials and basic products




08.1 Iron and steel
08.2 Non-ferrous metals
08.3 Metal goods










10.3 Air- and spacecraft
10.4 Watercraft
11 Precision instruments, clocks and watches and jewellery
11.1 Precision instruments and equipment
11.2 Watches
11.3 Jewellery and household goods made from precious metals




12.4 Toys and sports equipment
12.5 Stationery goods
12.6 Various goods such as umbrellas, neon signs, festive articles, brushes, lighters, pipes, etc.
Note: The table shows all product groups of our data set. The classification follows the FCA’s
grouping by the nature of goods.
Table A.2: Descriptives Statistics
Monthly Data, Jan.–Jun. 2020 N Mean SD Min Max
Year-on-Year %-Changes Exports 300 -3.49 35.02 -70.70 309.21
Year-on-Year %-Changes Imports 300 -8.49 35.75 -99.62 198.94
Covid-19 Cases per 1000 People 300 0.52 1.36 0.00 14.80
Stringency Index Countermeasures 300 49.96 30.46 0.00 100
Consumer Confidence (in SD) 215 -0.69 1.30 -3.85 2.51
Purchasing Manager Index (in SD) 164 -1.62 1.77 -7.39 1.37
Quarterly Data, Q1 & Q2 2020 N Mean SD Min Max
Year-on-Year %-Changes Exports 110 -3.49 23.75 -54.24 100.14
Year-on-Year %-Changes Imports 110 -9.50 29.82 -95.96 107.58
Covid-19 Cases per 1000 People 110 1.41 3.44 0.00 32.77
Stringency Index Countermeasures 110 45.85 27.511 6.17 92.59
Consumer Confidence (in SD) 79 -0.62 1.23 -3.38 1.93
Purchasing Manager Index (in SD) 56 -1.59 1.27 -5.19 0.30
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the regression ana-
lysis reported in Tables 2 and 3. Sources: FCA, Johns Hopkins University’s Coronavi-
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